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THE COURT OF APPEALS, 1953 TERM
I. ADmiNisTRATrv LAW
Standing to Sue
The ability of the sovereign retroactively to alter "rights"
given by previous acts of the sovereign was reaffirmed in Black
River Regulating District v. Adirondack League Club.' It was
there held that a river regulating district, organized pursuant to
article seven of the Conservation Law, which had made consid-
erable expenditures preliminary to financing a bond issue to pay
for the construction of a dam for the purpose of stream regula-
tion, had no standing to challenge an act of the State Legislature
which in effect prohibited the building of the dam.2
Regulation of streams and rivers by means of dams and
reservoirs is a matter of State concern in the interest of public
health, safety and welfare.3  Though regulating districts are pub-
lic corporations, 4 they are State agencies in the carrying out of a
State function, and their powers are within the absolute discre-
tion of the State, subject to alteration, impairment or destruction
as the State sees fit." That such powers do not constitute prop-
erty and are not protected by the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment has been established by a long line of Federal
and New York decisions.'
1. 307 N.Y. 475, 121 N.E. 2d 428 (1954).
2. L. 1950, c. 803, eff. Apr. 20, 1950, amending Conservation Law, § 445. Before
1913, the State Constitution forbade the sale or lease of any portion of the Forest
Preserve for any purpose. N.Y. CONsT. Art. 7, § 7 (1894). In that year this provision
was amended to allow up to three percentum of the Forest Preserve to be used for
construction and maintenance of reservoirs for municipal water supply and to regulate
the flow of streams. L. 1913, p. 2229. It was under this provision that the plaintiff
District was organized in 1919 and formulated its plans for the construction of the
dam now in controversy, which construction would have required the use of 1500 acres
of the Forest Preserve. In 1950, the State Legislature passed the Stokes Act, L. 1950,
c. 803, providing that no reservoirs for any purpose other than municipal water supply
were to be constructed in the area where the District planned its dam. This suit is
an attack on the constitutionality of that statute. However, in 1953, the Ostrander
Amendment was adopted which cancelled the exception in favor of stream regulation
and which in effect covered the ground of the Stokes Act, at least at far as this case
is concerned, making consideration of that Act largely irrelevant. Under the Consti-
tution as it now reads, up to three percentum of the Forest Preserve may be utilized
for the construction of dams only for municipal water supply. N. Y. CoNST. Art. 14, § 2.
3. CONSERVATION LAw Art. 7; Board of Black River Regulating District v.
Ogsbury, 203 App. Div. 43, 196 N.Y. Supp. 281 (4th Dep't 1922), aff'd 235 N.Y. 600,
139 N.E. 751 (1923).
4. CONSERvATION LAw § 431.
5. Black River Regulating District v. Adirondack League Club, see note 1 supra.
6. Williamsburg v. New Jersey, 130 U. S. 189 (1889), Hunter v. City of Pitts-
burg, 207 U. S. 161 (1907), City of Pawhuska v. Pawhuska Oil & Gas Co., et al., 250
U. S. 394 (1919), City of Trenton v. State of New Jersey, 262 U. S. 182 (1923), People
v. Morris, 13 Wend. 325 (1835), County of Albany v. Hooker, 204 N.Y. 1, 97 N.E.
403 (1912), City of New York v. Village of Lawrence, 250 N.Y. 429, 165 N. E. 836
(1929).
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
The Regulating District attempted to show that it had in-
terests separate from those of a public, State nature in that it
had obligated itself to pay preliminary expenses by issuing cer-
tificates of indebtedness. The Appellate Division unanimously
held that this fact took the District out of the operation of the
general rule and gave it independent contracts which could not be
constitutionally impaired.7 The Court of Appeals unanimously
rejected this, holding that .whatever contracts creditors had with
the District were also "subject to legitimate governmental power,
exercised on behalf of the public welfare." 8  Also rejected was the
claim that the District had an individual as well as a State char-
acter which gave it private rights.' Only public rights are in-
volved and these plaintiffs have no property interest in them.10
Only the State's interests are involved and the State cannot chal-
lenge the constitutionality of its own statute.1"
Thus it is held that these plaintiffs have no standing to sue
since they have no interests other than public, State interests.
The court also says that it "holds" that the Stokes Act 12 is con-
stitutional, though this statement is undoubtedly dictum in view
of the holding that the District has no standing to challenge it
in the first place.
It is somewhat surprising that the court did not dispose of
the whole case merely by citing the effect of the Ostrander Amend-
ment. 3 Plaintiffs admitted the Stokes Act prohibited its intended
construction and the case got this far only because the constitu-
tionality of that statute was challenged. The Ostrander Amend-
ment is equally dispositive of the District's plan and puts it be-
yond redemption by any means, save another constitutional
amendment.
7. Black River Regulating District v. Adirondack League Club, 282 App. Div.
161, 170, 121 N. Y. S. 2d 893, 902 (4th Dep't 1953).
8. 307 N. Y. at 489, 121 N. E. 2d at 434, citing Norman v. Baltimore & Oho
R. R. Co., 294 U. S. 240 (1935), People ex rel. Durham Realty Corp. v. La Fetra, 230
N. Y. 429, 130 N. E. 601 (1921).
9. Citing Bull v. Stichman, 273 App. Div. 311, 78 N. Y. S. 2d 279, aff'd 298 N. Y.
516, 80 N.E. 2d 661 (1948).
10. Hodges v. Snyder, 261 U. S. 600 (1923).
11. Sweeney v. State of New York, 251 N.Y. 417, 167 N.E. 519 (1929). But
see First Construction Co. of Brooklyn v. State of New York, 221 N. Y. 295, 310, 116
N.E. 1020, 1024 (1917).
12. See note 2 supra.
13. See note 2 supra. Even though this amendment was not yet in existence at
the commencement of the suit and the appeal before the Appellate Division
, 
the issue
must be decided in accordance with present law. United States v. The Schooner Peggy,
1 Cranch 103 (1801), Boardwalk & Seashore Corp. v. Murdock, 286 N.Y. 494, 36 N.E.
2d 678 (1941).
